UbitUmarov
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e043d8a2eb
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use array.Empty<byte>
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2022-03-12 15:21:24 +00:00 |
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UbitUmarov
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713c222ec8
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remove some redundancy
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2020-05-11 15:12:21 +01:00 |
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UbitUmarov
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c99014991b
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cosmetics
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2020-04-09 13:41:41 +01:00 |
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UbitUmarov
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67cd5efab3
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replace external httpserver by embedded one (based on same code) - This may still be very bad; clean solution and runprebuild, or clone to clan folder
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2020-04-02 21:44:34 +01:00 |
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Melanie Thielker
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b16abc8166
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Massive tab and trailing space cleanup
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2017-01-05 19:07:37 +00:00 |
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teravus
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85593d8d25
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* Add an initial complete frame timeout to the WebSocket processor to make it easier to write WebSocket service code that is resistant to Denial of Service attacks.
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2013-10-04 20:37:59 -05:00 |
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Justin Clark-Casey (justincc)
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a33b6eed6d
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minor: remove mono compiler warnings in WebsocketServerHandler.cs
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2013-06-20 00:54:19 +01:00 |
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teravus
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69fbcdf14c
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* Add a Max Payload size property to the Websocket Server Handler. If you would like to restrict the maximum packet size, (and therefore protect against Memory DOSing) then you should set this. I defaulted it to 40MB. This means that in theory, a malicious user could connect and send a packet that claims that the payload is up to 40 mb (even if it doesn't actually turn out to be 40mb. More testing needs to be done on it where the packets are maliciously malformed.
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2013-03-05 00:04:09 -05:00 |
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teravus
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c22276a169
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* gracefully handle a Situation where a double close is called on the WebSocket handler
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2013-02-14 18:43:53 -05:00 |
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teravus
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4867a7cbbf
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This is the final commit that enables the Websocket handler
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2013-02-07 10:27:18 -05:00 |
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